Democracy, Legitimacy, and Global Governance by Lefkowitz, David





What property (or properties) render international institutions and law 
legitimate, such that those over whom they claim jurisdiction ought to 
defer to their directives rather than acting on their own judgment? In this 
essay I critically examine Tom Christiano’s treatment of two possible 
answers to this question: global democracy, and an institution’s or legal 
regime’s capacity to enhance its subjects’ responsiveness to the reasons for 
action that apply to them. While Christiano rightly rejects the inference 
from affected interests to global democracy, his argument elides the 
fundamental reason we ought to do so, namely that at present the degree 
of cross-border interdependence does not rise to the level where it is 
possible for citizens of different states to treat one another justly only by 
submitting to a common legal order that substantially erodes state 
sovereignty.  International law and institutions can enjoy some legitimacy 
on instrumental grounds, however, even if they are neither democratic nor 
the product of agreement in free and fair conditions.  
Keywords: democracy, international law, legitimacy, authority, 
republicanism
INTRODUCTION
What property (or properties) render international institutions and law 
legitimate, such that those over whom they claim jurisdiction ought to 
defer to their directives rather than acting on their own judgment? In this 
essay I critically examine Tom Christiano’s treatment of two possible 
answers to this question: global democracy, and an institution’s or legal 
regime’s capacity to enhance its subjects’ responsiveness to the reasons for 
action that apply to them (Christiano 2010, 2011). With respect to the 
former, I argue that while Christiano rightly rejects the inference from 
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affected interests to global democracy, his argument elides the fundamental 
reason we ought to do so, namely that at present the degree of cross-border 
interdependence does not rise to the level where it is possible for citizens of 
different states to treat one another justly only by submitting to a common 
legal order that substantially erodes state sovereignty. With respect to the 
latter, I argue that international law and institutions can enjoy some 
legitimacy on instrumental grounds, that their doing so does not depend 
on their being either democratic or the product of agreement in free and 
fair conditions, and that we can reliably identify legislative and judicial 
mechanisms that satisfy the instrumental standard for law’s legitimacy.
1. AGAINST GLOBAL DEMOCRACY
A common argument for global democracy infers that from the fact that 
the conduct of people in one state affects the interests (or, more narrowly, 
those interests that ground human rights) of those living in other states 
that the former can treat the latter justly only by submitting to a common 
legal order whose laws are enacted by a directly elected global parliament 
(see, e.g. Archibuigi and Held 1995). While Christiano is right to reject this 
inference, the arguments he offers to support this conclusion mask what I 
contend is its fundamental error, namely that if it is possible for agents to 
treat one another justly by limiting their interactions so that they do not 
threaten to setback one another’s fundamental interests, then they are not 
morally required to submit to a common set of rules that govern these 
interactions. Instead, the decision to do so is one over which agents exercise 
moral discretion. This position is simply the converse of Kant’s well-known 
argument for the moral necessity of the state, which holds that where 
agents cannot avoid interacting with one another justice requires that they 
submit to a common legal order.
Consider Christiano’s unequal stakes argument against global 
democracy. He asserts that a far greater level of interdependence of 
interests obtains for those who are citizens of the same state than for those 
who are citizens of different states (Christiano 2010: 132-33; Christiano 
2011: 74-5). The former share a common world, while the latter do not.  But 
what exactly should we infer from this, supposing it is true?  One possibility 
is that absent their sharing a common world democratic government will 
fail to publicly treat all subject to the resulting laws equally. A second 
possibility, though, is that absent a common world the level of 
interdependence of interests among a set of agents does not rise to the level 
where it is impossible for them to treat one another justly except by 
submitting to the same legal order. Though the two possibilities are not 
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mutually exclusive, the second provides the more fundamental objection. 
This is so because the question of whether agents are morally required to 
submit to a common set of rules regulating some type of conduct is prior to 
the question of how the rules of such an order ought to be made if they are 
to be legitimate. The principle of public equality provides an answer to the 
latter question, but to answer the former Christiano needs a version of the 
affected interests principle, namely one that holds that agents have a duty 
to submit to a common legal order if and only if doing so is necessary to 
avoid setbacks to their own and/or to others’ fundamental interest in 
judgment.
Christiano’s assessment of the advantages the Fair Democratic 
Association (FDA) model of global governance has over global democracy 
lends further support to the claim that it is the possibility of treating others 
justly without submitting to a common set of rules that blocks the inference 
from affected interests to global democracy. For example, Christiano 
maintains that a FDA is better able to mitigate the problem of persistent 
minorities “because states can refuse to enter into negotiations and 
agreements” (Christiano 2011: 81; Christiano 2010: 136). This claim implies, 
however, that the model of global democracy fails because it compels 
groups or states to submit to a particular legal regime when they need not 
do so in order to treat others justly. While it’s bad enough to be a persistent 
minority within a governing institution, it is even worse to be needlessly 
compelled to be a persistent minority within such an institution.
With respect to the different stakes states may have in a particular 
system of international legal rules, e.g. those governing trade, Christiano 
alleges a FDA will be superior to global democracy because “states with 
high stakes in an agreement can invest a lot of time and energy in it, while 
states with lesser stakes presumably will invest less time and energy” 
(Christiano 2011: 81; Christiano 2010: 136). Yet the focus on time and energy 
seems misguided for two reasons. First, a global democracy might serve 
equally well as a mechanism whereby those with greater stakes, such as 
representatives of districts heavily involved in international trade, invest 
greater time and energy in the development of, e.g., international trade 
rules, while those with less at stake (or their representatives) devote less 
time and energy. Second, what is most important is not how much time 
and energy different agents devote to the development of international 
legal norms but how the authority to make those norms is distributed.  If 
votes are equally distributed, despite unequal stakes, then Christiano is 
committed to the resulting law being illegitimate. The FDA’s true advantage 
over global democracy vis-à-vis the existence of unequal stakes is that 
states enjoy moral discretion over whether to enter into international 
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agreements, and the terms on which they are willing to do so. The FDA 
model conceives of much new international law not as a set of impartial 
rules that aim to promote the common good but as mutually advantageous 
arrangements agreed to under free and fair conditions by parties pursuing 
their own interests on the basis of their relative bargaining power. The 
upshot is that those states with greater stakes will likely exercise a greater 
say in the construction of this kind of international law than will states 
with lesser stakes, since those are the terms on which it will be rational for 
both parties to converge. And as long as the resulting legal regimes are 
both genuinely morally optional (i.e. not required for the just treatment of 
others) and entered into under free and fair conditions, the resulting norms 
will be consistent with the publicly equal treatment of all. 
One final advantage Christiano attributes to the FDA model of global 
governance over global democracy is that the former is less vulnerable to 
the problem of citizenship than the latter. Note, first, that even if this is 
true it is not clear that the FDA model of global governance mitigates the 
problem of citizenship to a degree sufficient to render the resulting norms 
legitimate. The extent to which individuals are informed about and take 
responsibility for the content of international law may still be so slight that 
it does not warrant the belief that international law publicly treats them all 
as equals. Second, global democracy may offer avenues for representation 
the FDA does not that serve to galvanize a more informed and invested 
citizenry. For example, global democracy might facilitate a greater voice 
for views that are in the minority domestically, whereas negotiations 
between democratic states might well present only the views of the 
domestic majority. In addition, by increasing the number of institutions 
that might assert a right to govern a particular domain of conduct, global 
democracy could also foster the kind of forum shopping that can both lead 
to creative solutions to conflicts over the demands of justice and enhance 
agents’ belief that the overall system of governance exemplifies a 
commitment to the equal advancement of interests (see, e.g. Berman 2014). 
Third, and most importantly, when viewed through the lens of the problem 
of citizenship the key distinction between a FDA and global democracy 
appears to be whether international legislators are to be directly elected or 
indirectly elected; for example, appointed by domestic legislators who are 
themselves directly elected, as was originally the method for selecting 
United States Senators. But which of these two models of representation 
we should adopt is a separate matter from the question of whether states 
and the individuals they represent have a duty to submit to a common legal 
order. Thus we might argue that becoming a party to a particular legal 
regime, e.g. one governing trade in a particular class of goods, is morally 
optional, while also maintaining that if the regime creates a somewhat 
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independent institution charged with developing this body of law its 
officials ought to be directly elected rather than appointed by the domestic 
legislatures of its member states.
A possible response to the foregoing argument would be to contend 
that: (1) in certain circumstances, which presently obtain internationally, 
parties have a moral duty to submit to a common legal order governing 
some specified type of activity; but (2) because the parties do not have 
roughly equal stakes in the activity governed by the legal regime in 
question, its norms should not be made by a democratic decision-procedure 
that accords them all an equal voice. Though Christiano appears to believe 
that at present the first of the aforementioned conditions is rarely met, 
Laura Valentini has recently defended this position, arguing explicitly 
against Christiano that democratic legitimacy does not require an equal 
say but only a say proportional to the stakes individuals have in the 
resulting law (Valentini 2014; see also Brighouse and Fleurbaey 2010). As I 
will now demonstrate, however, the examples she gives to illustrate the 
joint satisfaction of the two conditions specified above fail to do so. Thus it 
remains unclear whether once we have limited the scope of democratic 
authority to important interests (as Valentini maintains we should) it will 
still be the case that the parties in question have different stakes in the 
decision.
Valentini asserts: “it is unreasonable to deny that, say, the inhabitants 
of Bangladesh have a greater stake in decisions about how to deal with 
anthropogenic climate change than the residents of the United Kingdom” 
(Valentini 2014: 795). Presumably that is because climate change poses a 
greater threat of harm to them than it does to the lives of UK residents. In 
the short term that is likely true, but in the long term it is not. British and 
Bangladeshis have equal interests in the adoption of climate policies that 
cap the increase in the Earth’s average global temperature, but they may 
well differ with respect to what the optimal increase is. Claiming that 
Bangladeshis have a greater interest in a lower peak average global 
temperature than do residents of the UK is not the same as maintaining 
that they have a greater interest in the question of what the optimal level of 
climate emissions are, or what policies ought to be adopted in pursuit of 
that optimum. Climate policy, then, looks like a matter (one of very few, 
perhaps) in which all people on Earth have a significant and roughly equal 
stake.
Valentini’s second example concerns laws aimed at facilitating access 
to public spaces for the disabled. “Legislation about disabled access to 
public spaces has greater impact on people with disabilities than on the 
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rest of a country’s population”, which, she implies, entails that the disabled 
ought to have proportionally greater say in the crafting of such legislation 
than do the able (Valentini 2014: 795). Like the example of climate policy 
this argument begins in the wrong place, namely with the effects of the 
legislation rather than the interests in the activity it regulates. Access to 
public spaces is something in which all individuals have an equal interest 
(or so I shall assume), and so all ought to have an equal say in the crafting 
of legal regulations that specify what those who maintain public spaces 
must do to advance these interests. Deviation from a procedure that does 
so is called for only if the disabled turn out to be a persistent minority (as, 
in fact, has often been the case); that is, where an individual-majoritarian 
decision-procedure has persistently failed to correct the cognitive biases 
of the able regarding what the equal advancement of the interest in access 
to public spaces requires, and left the disabled feeling both alienated from 
society and not recognized as moral equals. While this argument sanctions 
an unequal say in making law, the rationale for doing so does not rest on 
unequal interests in the issue regulated by the law in question but the 
persistent failure of a process that accords an equal say to all entitled to it 
to generate just law.
Of course, these criticisms of Valentini do not demonstrate the 
impossibility of satisfying both of the conditions set out above. Absent a 
successful illustration, however, we have no reason to believe there are any 
cases in which a given type of conduct affects a set of individuals’ important 
interests in ways that morally require them to submit to a common legal 
order governing that conduct, but where those individuals have 
significantly different stakes in what the content of those legal rules turns 
out to be. 
At present, the common legal rules to which all agents, or the political 
communities of which they are members, have a moral duty to submit are 
largely those that serve to preserve the independence (or non-domination) 
of the distinct common worlds that exist and are partly constructed by 
their domestic legal orders. These are the core rules of Westphalian 
International Law, e.g. those that ban aggressive war and intervention in 
the domestic affairs of other states, or that internalize externalities by, for 
instance, allocating responsibility for cross-border pollution. A world in 
which such rules were respected would be one in which no individual’s 
fundamental interests were setback by the conduct of agents who reside in 
other states. Again, that is not to say that in such a world the activities of 
individuals in one state would not impact the lives of those living in others, 
nor does it deny that all might stand to gain by the adoption of a common 
set of legal norms that eroded sovereignty for the purpose of creating a 
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partial common world (e.g. a common market in certain goods). Neither of 
these facts, however, entails that individuals can treat people in other 
states justly only by submitting to common legal rules that take the place of 
or circumscribes existing domestic law.
2. AN INSTRUMENTAL ARGUMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL 
LAW’S LEGITIMACY
Might international law enjoy some legitimacy even if it is the product of a 
legislative procedure that fails to fully conform to the principle of public 
equality? Though he sometimes appears to think otherwise, in this final 
section I argue that Christiano ought to give an affirmative answer to this 
question.
Recall that to characterize law as legitimate is to maintain that when 
they deliberate its subjects have a moral reason to defer to its judgment 
regarding what they may, must, or must not do even in a range of cases in 
which the law’s judgment conflicts with their own. For Christiano law is 
fully (and inherently) legitimate if and only if it is the product of a law-
making process that satisfies the principle of public equality: specifically, 
a democratic decision-making process in the case of a common world, and 
free and fair agreement where submission to a common rule is morally 
optional. At least in circumstances characterized by the facts of judgment, 
it is only by guiding their conduct according to law made in a way that 
satisfies the principle of public equality that individuals can advance or 
honor one another’s fundamental interests in judgment. These include the 
interest in correcting for others’ cognitive biases, the interest in being at 
home in the world, and the interest in being treated by one’s fellows as a 
person with equal moral standing. The value of the first of these interests 
appears to be largely instrumental; that is, the ability and opportunity to 
correct others’ cognitive biases is valuable primarily because – and to the 
extent that – it makes it more likely that individuals will treat one another 
justly. Or perhaps the point would be better put in terms of reducing the 
incidence and severity of unjust treatment. Regardless, suppose we 
concede arguendo that law made democratically or agreed to in free and 
fair conditions best serves the aim of advancing justice (or reducing 
injustice) by combatting cognitive bias. Nevertheless, other legislative 
procedures that perform less well in this respect may perform well enough 
that their subjects do better at treating one another justly by obeying the 
law than by acting on their own judgment, even in a range of cases where 
they think it substantively mistaken. If so, the law produced by such 
procedures will enjoy some legitimacy in virtue of its advancing individuals’ 
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fundamental interests in having others, and their own, cognitive biases 
corrected.
The form of the foregoing argument is most closely associated with 
Joseph Raz’s service conception of legitimate authority. Raz maintains that 
A enjoys legitimate authority over B if the following two conditions are met 
(Raz 2006: 1014):
(1)  The Normal Justification Condition (NJC): The subject would 
better conform to reasons that apply to him anyway (that is, to rea-
sons other than the directives of the authority) if he intends to be 
guided by the authority’s directives than if he does not.
(2)  The Independence Condition (IC): The matters regarding which 
the first condition is met are such that with respect to them it is 
better to conform to reason than to decide for oneself, unaided by 
authority.
Where the NJC and IC are met, B has a duty to defer to A’s judgment; that 
is, to act as A directs him to act even if B believes he has an undefeated 
reason to act otherwise. As I understand it, the service conception provides 
a formal analysis of legitimate authority, by which I mean it tells us the 
kind of argument we must offer if we are to substantiate or successfully 
contest the claim that a putative authority, such as international law 
generally or WTO law in particular, enjoys legitimacy. But the service 
conception itself tells us neither what reasons apply to agents independently 
of the law, nor how obedience to law serves to advance our conformity to 
those reasons. For example, the service conception does not rule out the 
possibility that individuals have fundamental interests in being at home in 
an egalitarian world and in recognition as a moral equal that all agents 
have reason to advance, nor the possibility that obedience to law can 
facilitate their doing so by constituting the advancement of those interests.1 
Theorists may dispute the existence or the importance of these interests, 
or the ways in which law may enhance its subjects’ responsiveness to them, 
without disagreeing over the general account of legitimate authority 
provided by the service conception.2
Our concern, however, is whether law can enjoy legitimacy solely in 
virtue of its content reflecting less cognitive bias than does the judgment of 
its subjects. It seems obvious to me that it can, and that where the law’s 
judgment regarding the demands of justice suffer from less cognitive bias 
1  On Christiano’s account, law serves to advance those interests in this way if it is 
the product of a process that satisfies the principle of public equality.
2  Christiano acknowledges as much; see Christiano (2008: 55).
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than do the judgments of its subjects, they have a duty to obey it.3 But 
Christiano’s admonition that justice must not only be done, but be seen to 
be done, rings true even where we are concerned only with law as a means 
to realizing justice (or mitigating injustice). While the service conception 
tells us when, as an objective matter, a legal subject has a duty to obey the 
law, we also need an account of how we are to identify when a putative 
authority satisfies the service conception. In the case of democratically 
enacted law, the right to an equal say serves both to correct cognitive bias 
and to provide subjects with reason to believe that the resulting law reflects 
a good faith effort to equally advance the interests of all (enfranchised 
citizens) even where the content of the law strikes some subjects as at odds 
with that aim. Might legislative processes that are neither democratic nor 
voluntary agreements reached under free and fair conditions satisfy this 
evidential demand as well, so that they not only satisfy the NJC by, at a 
minimum, reducing some of the injustice individuals’ cognitive biases can 
cause, but can be reliably identified as doing so? I think the answer is yes, 
and at least with respect to the law of international organizations such as 
the WTO, Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane’s standard of complex 
legitimacy provides one example of an institutional design that would do so. 
The complex standard of legitimacy consists of a set of substantive and 
procedural requirements that, when met, provide evidence for the 
legitimacy of a global governance institution’s attempt to rule (Buchanan 
and Keohane 2006). The former include not persistently violating the least 
controversial human rights, and not intentionally or knowingly engaging 
in conduct at odds with the global governance institutions’ purported 
aims and commitments. The latter include mechanisms for holding global 
governance institutions accountable for meeting the aforementioned 
substantive requirements, as well as mechanisms for contesting the terms 
of accountability. To be effective, these mechanisms must be broadly 
transparent; e.g. information about how the institution works must be not 
only available but also accessible to both internal and external actors, such 
as inspectors general and non-governmental organizations.  
What unifies the various elements of the complex standard is that they 
all provide the legal subjects of global governance institutions with reason 
to believe that officials in these institutions are making a good faith effort 
to determine what justice requires. In the absence of one or more elements 
of the complex standard those subject to a global governance institution’s 
rule may (rightly) suspect that governance is being exercised in pursuit of 
3  For descriptions of some of the ways in which international law can serve as a 
check on judgments of justice distorted by international actors’ predictable cognitive biases, 
see Tasioulas (2010); Lefkowitz (2016). 
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other goals, such as the national interests of powerful states. Consider, for 
example, the substantive elements of the complex standard: no attempt at 
international governance by either global governance institutions or by 
states that persistently violated “the least controversial human rights”, or 
that systematically discriminated in the application and enforcement of 
international legal norms, could plausibly claim to be making a good faith 
effort to enhance its subjects’ conformity to the demands of justice. 
Similarly, the procedural elements that compose the complex standard 
evidence a good faith effort to determine what right reason requires 
because they militate against efforts to deploy international law for private 
interest rather than the public good.
Christiano acknowledges the value of reforming global governance 
institutions so that they satisfy the complex standard of legitimacy, but 
denies that such reforms could render their rule legitimate. Something like 
complex legitimacy, he writes,
may give us reason to think that the institutions will produce 
minimally desirable outcomes. We may often have reason, therefore, 
to go along with those outcomes. But it does not give us the kind of 
moral legitimacy that implies reasons to go along with them even 
when we disagree with the outcomes (Christiano 2011: 94). 
It seems to me that Christiano makes the perfect enemy of the good, 
and in doing so downplays two crucial considerations. The first is that our 
own judgments regarding the justice of the outcomes of global governance 
institutions that satisfy the complex standard necessarily, and predictably, 
reflect our biases and fallibility. In acting on those judgments, therefore, 
we may be less likely to treat others justly than if we obey the law. The 
second is that the law’s legitimacy requires only that its subjects be more 
likely to “get it right” by deferring to it than by acting on their own judgment. 
In circumstances where domestic political officeholders generally know 
very little about the interests of people living in other states and act within 
an institutional structure that provides them with a strong incentive to be 
unjustifiably biased toward the interests of citizens and against the 
interests of foreigners, the bar for international law’s legitimacy may be set 
quite low. Indeed the complex standard suggests as much. Thus I maintain 
that satisfaction of the complex standard of legitimacy does provide those 
subject to the resulting law with a duty to defer to it, a presumption in favor 
of doing so sufficiently weighty to warrant conformity to the law even in 
some range of cases in which agents believe the law is mistaken on its 
merits.
In The Constitution of Equality Christiano maintains that the mere fact 
that one is more likely to act as one has most reason to act by obeying the 
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law than by acting on one’s own judgment cannot provide a sufficient 
condition for the legitimacy of domestic law.4 If it did then individuals 
could have a duty to obey (some of) the law of deeply unjust states, but that 
is absurd. Such states often “implicitly threaten morally terrible 
consequences if their subjects do not comply with commands that require 
them to participate in evil activities” (Christiano 2008: 234). Christiano 
maintains, however, that: “even if complying without question is the right 
thing to do, the authority that issues the directives is clearly not legitimate” 
(Christiano 2008: 234). Might a version of this argument apply to 
international law, either in general or vis-à-vis specific international legal 
regimes? Note, first, that the complex standard of legitimacy may well 
satisfy Christiano’s demand that a political institution “have some 
reasonable degree of justice” in order to be legitimate. But second and 
more importantly, as I argued above, the significance for a political 
institution’s legitimacy of its satisfying certain minimal demands of justice 
is partly epistemic. Where the institution fails to do so, its subjects have no 
reason to believe that it meets the NJC. As Christiano notes, they may still 
judge that they will do best by conforming to the unjust state’s laws, or 
even treating its laws as if they were authoritative. Their operative reason 
for doing so, however, likely will not (and should not) be the belief that the 
unjust state is more likely than they to determine what justice truly requires 
of them. Moreover, this conclusion holds even in those cases where, as a 
matter of fact, the unjust state is more likely than its subjects to discern 
what justice truly requires of them.5 Where the NJC is satisfied those whose 
just treatment is at issue have a claim against the law’s subjects that they 
obey it rather than act on their own judgment. Those who are subject to the 
rule of a deeply unjust state are unlikely to be at fault for failing to discharge 
this duty, however; after all, they have little or no reason to believe they 
have it.
As noted above, the foregoing argument rests on a distinction between 
what it is for A to enjoy legitimate authority over B, namely that B ought to 
act as A directs rather than on her own judgment, and the reasons that 
justify A’s legitimate authority over B; that is, the reasons why B ought to 
4  Christiano develops this argument as an objection to the NJC, but in light of the 
earlier discussion in the text I think it better to construe it as an objection to a specific way 
in which law can serve to enhance its subjects just conduct (or at least reduce the injustice 
they commit).
5  One source of hesitation to embrace this conclusion may be the thought that no 
one can owe obedience to a political institution that perpetrates grave injustices. Where 
law’s legitimacy is a matter of it increasing the likelihood that its subjects will act justly, 
however, the duty to obey is owed not to the law (or legal officials) but to those the law’s 
subjects are more likely to treat justly by obeying the law than by acting on their own 
judgment. See Lefkowitz (2016) for discussion of this point.
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act as A directs. One advantage to drawing this distinction is that it allows 
us to focus on the most prominent substantive divide among theorists of 
legitimate authority, i.e. whether the exercise of moral judgment warrants 
respect per se, independent of its veracity, rather than getting bogged down 
in definitional battles.6 A second advantage to foregrounding the 
distinction drawn above is that it enables the concept of legitimacy to play 
a role in both ideal and non-ideal theories of global governance. Christiano’s 
FDA may model legitimate authority in an ideal moral community, and as 
such it may provide a lodestone for long-term reforms to the global political 
order. In the near and medium-term, however, the extent to which the 
current world order deviates from that ideal may render the purely 
instrumental accounts of international law’s legitimacy more important, 
both for rebutting those who deny that international law enjoys any 
legitimate authority and as a guide to feasible reforms that can begin to 
mitigate the extent to which international law and institutions serve merely 
as tools for the powerful.
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